Max Planck
stated very clearly a premise that would later fuel Popper: Science cannot give
the final answers to anything. Of
course, such a statement would imply, automatically, the qualification of
Metaphysics to reveal, expose and explain that which Science cannot… This is not the only thing in which we
should dissent with Popper.
Let’s
briefly go over some of the arguable statements of this man.
Sir Karl
Popper stated:
Of
Freud: That his predictions were as
elusive as those of astrology.
Of the
scientific method of induction: He
discards it in favor of starting the scientific work from an imaginary or even
mythological conjecture of the world.
Of
science: “The erroneous perspective of
science is discovered by its avidity to be real”.
About Nazism:
“Its origin would be that of the sincere purpose of men to improve their
condition and that of their peers”.
About
absolute truths: That it is not
possible to reach them, but it is possible to get near.
About determinism: It does not exist.
About
history: It does not exist.
About
truth: In science, it is unreachable.
Enormously
popularized by Phillip Johnson, whom through the Evangelical Service of
Documentation and Information published notes commending his work in “Darwin on
Trial” (1991) (the reader can refer to Ch. 12 of the same book: “Sir Karl
Popper. Psychoanalysis, Science and Pseudoscience”); Johnson is also the author
of a work whose title says it all:
“Defeating Darwinism by Opening Minds” (1997).
Popper was
a personal friend of Helmut Schmidt (member of the Government of West Germany
as Minister and Chancellor between 1969 and 1982, time in which relations
between the Catholic Church and the State are thawed. Catholic printing presses launch 4.5 million
works annually, 31 newspapers of the same ideology print 13 million copies
daily, and an iron pact between all the European conservative parties is sealed
– Christians, lays, English, Gaullists, fascists-) and is the author of works
in which he affirms that the invention of the printing press belongs to
northern Europe, when China had already developed it several centuries before
(perhaps the fact that this country would fall outside of the orbit of
monotheistic religions, whose principles seem to have played a very important
role in Popper’s convictions, is what prevented the acceptance of the true time
and place where such an invention was actually made…). Perhaps his attack in Freud is also very coherent:
Sigmund studied the religious phenomenon as a simple mental problem, whilst
Popper has no scruples in accepting an act of faith (“imaginary or mythological
conjecture”) as a presupposition to initiate scientific analyses. Coincidentally, in the pages of the Spanish
catholic magazine “La Fe”, already in 1844 it was possible to read the
following words “Human sciences rest largely upon a type of faith…”
Just as
other characters would do, Popper attempts to minimize the scientific aim
assigning it what he calls “avidity” to reach the truth, and condemning it to
impotence in such field. When we
reflect upon this obscurely critical attitude, we again find coincidence
between his words and that of the previously mentioned catholic magazine:
“Which is the wise man so intimately convinced of the truth of the causes, as
the evidence of the effects? (…) Who, if God himself does not descend to reveal
him, could say…: This geological or astronomical system, of medical or natural
sciences, is a complete and definitive system?” The coincidences with such concepts are
coherent with other Popperian affirmations: science cannot describe reality,
determinism does not exist, and much less does history, while he is implicitly
completely sure of the existence of absolute truths.
We do not
wish to erroneously conclude that Sir Popper, when disqualifying contemporary
science (and sending the Freudian Theory to the garbage pile), could not ignore
the fact that he would replace Metaphysics within those disciplines capable of
providing knowledge valid to humanity.
And who knows if, inwardly, he didn’t think that “all the sciences, the
physical as well as the moral, should parade in front of religious science, as
daughters parade in front of their mother, bending the knee…” (“Revista
Religiosa, Política y Literaria La Fe”, Spain
Popper and Falsifiability
Popper was
a communist around age 15, and anti-Marxist upon reaching 17. He opposed Positivism and the Wiener Kreis (Vienna Circle
 |
| Some members of the Wiener Kreis: Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Hans Hahn and Philipp Frank. |
Before
Popper, the Science model firstly described by Francis Bacon, which conceived
it as an exercise in induction, gets criticism from Hume, whom casts a light of
doubt on the assurance that a series of objective observations might reveal
exceptions that refute the norm. Hume,
who didn’t seem to be able to know how to refute the Plan Argument as “proof” of
the existence of God, did also not reach the illuminated reflection of Albert
Bayet:
“In as much as religions and philosophies of
the absolute seek primarily to secure unassailable positions, in which they
shall forever affix their thought, science solely needs points of support which
serve its new conquests (…) The most beautiful hypotheses with which it
arranges knowledge bear the mark of relativity, and therefore of that which is
provisional; thus making nothing in it definite, nor nothing in it undisputable.”
No, Popper
wants absolute answers, and not relative ones.
Bayet’s idea would not have seemed “convincing” either and Mr. Karl
discards the inductive model considering that, in practice, theory precedes the
experiment and not the other way around.
But, then, where should be start?
And Popper, a lover of ideas with traces of absolutes (science cannot
reach the truth – determinism doesn’t exist – history doesn’t exist – the
printing press was not invented by the Chinese – the French Revolution “was
essentially a government of terrorists”, are all affirmations made by him),
proposes to use an imaginary or even
mythological conjecture of the world…
That conjecture will have to be submitted to criticism in search of disconfirming evidence which, should it
be found, will reveal the need for a new and better explanation. In other words, Popper admits, in principle, the possibility that an imaginary or even
mythological conjecture might be valid!
If this is not an attempt to salvage the good name of Metaphysics,
already widely discredited in its time, it sure looks like it…
We
mentioned “disconfirming evidence”. Let
us, then, explain Popper’s falsifiability.
Falsifiability is an epistemological current which affirms
that to state a theory means to refute it through a counter-example. If it cannot be refuted, then the theory
remains confirmed (but never verified,
given that truth, according to Popper,
is unattainable, and not even the observation of reality is useful to make
true rules or confirmed hypotheses).
That observation is useful for denying “fake” theories: scientific work, thus, is developed through
criticism and not observation. Science,
according to Popper, must not verify, but formulate new theories in
increasingly perfect fashion… Falsifiability is a criterion of verification
of the scientific validity.
“Falsating”
a theory, then, is to search for the fact that proves it is false. However, contrary to the beliefs of its
creator, falsifiability is far from covering all the possibilities; it has no
universal value. Therefore, infinite statements (such as “things are
such as they are”) are not falsable.
Furthermore, there are false
falsables (“X always happens”: false
because at some point X did not occur) and non-false falsables (“X is always X”).
Statements must fulfill certain conditions of validity: they must be
precise, falsable, clear, bold and daring.
This would mean that a scientific theory would have to possess a genuine
explanatory capacity in order to make risky predictions which exclude the
largest amount of possible results: the success in the prediction is impacting
only up and until failure is a real possibility.
In brief:
if a scientific hypothesis overcomes the effort to demonstrate its falseness,
it can be accepted –at least– provisionally.
Popper attributes to himself thus having given the World the
indispensable starting point in order to understand the difference between
science and pseudoscience. Nonetheless
it seems as if falsifiability could give a reasonable berth to certain grave
and hilarious valuation errors: falsifiability
enables us to distinguish, according to Popper, science from pseudoscience if
and when all the scientific predictions made may be wrong, explains P.
Bloom. Therefore, if we refer to
Astrology, for example, since its predictions can be tested in consideration of
the fact that they may be wrong, even
when they are wrong, they can be considered, in principle, scientific theories!
Our good
Sir also criticized the idea that science is, in essence, inductive, highlighting
instead its hypothetical-deductive nature.
This would
be the layout of the scientific process according to Popper:
Problem – Conjecture/Hypothesis – Falsation –
New Problem
Let’s now
turn our attention to a curious corollary of this Theory: once its “falsed”, a non-confirmed
hypothesis doesn’t become false, but must be further studied within the field
of Metaphysics… The “rehabilitation of
Metaphysics as a serious discipline is evident: in it are non-scientific hypotheses… but
nonetheless not false either (?). A
question that Popper “strategically” leaves out is: what happens when valid conclusions are
reached in Metaphysics… which collide with valid conclusions in Science?
This is not
the only aspect which comes through as suspiciously irrational in the popperian
thesis. Paraphrasing the famous (and
discredited) theologian saying “if everything has a cause, there must be a
first cause”, Popper’s henchman Hans Albert elaborates the Trilema of Münchhausen.
Albert holds that if we demand
fundaments from everything, we must also demand it from the knowledge which we
have redirected to the proposition which we are trying to support in the first
place. He thus pontificates that
this takes us to three equally inacceptable alternatives:
Regresum ad infinitum:
To go unendingly backwards in the search of support (which results
impossible in practice).
Logical circularity in
deduction: In the process of supporting our precepts,
we use statements which appeared as needed of support.
Arbitrary interruption
of the process: The principle of sufficient support
is suspended at a concrete point.
As may be
easily noted, the Trileme of Münchhausen is based on the need to reach
knowledge, such as in Religion, from entities whose existence has never been
proven; meaning, supposed absolute, definitive, eternal truths… Nothing farther from rational or scientific
thought: Neither regresum ad infinitum,
nor logical circularity in deduction, and much less the interruption of the
procedure, are neither viable nor acceptable alternatives in Science. Plausible, rational, and methodologically
correct methods to access knowledge possible and relative are the only humanely
suitable forms to make science. Man
has not fared at all badly with such methods…
Furthermore:
THERE IS NO regresum ad infinitum…
sincere there is no infinitum, you “go backwards” until you can find
probable support.
THERE IS NO logical circularity in deduction…
unless the process is in a purely speculative stave or procedural errors
are being made.
THERE IS NO arbitrary interruption of the
process… but logical limits to the evidential
satisfaction as established by the physical, temporal, or statistical empires.
The ideas
of Popper have been widely questioned.
Among those who reject them are highly relevant names from contemporary
thought: Habermas, Adorno, Feyerabend
(“science is not superior for its method or its results, there is no special, infallible method”), Kuhn, Wittgenstein,
Klosko, and Hokheimer.
Among Popper’s
errors that have been pointed out are:
- The propagation of irrationality through a particular conception of
science;
- Reducing rationality to instrumental
rationality,
without consideration for the rationality of the objectives or objectives which
the theories aim to reach;
- The elaboration of a useless mechanism for
economic science: falsifiability is not applied to economic practice
because it is of no avail to give account of the complex real economic
phenomena nor the effective proceedings of economic science;
- Absolute lack of interest in signification
but solely in the Theory which sustains that IT (the Theory) is previous to the
observance of the actions;
- Subordination of knowledge to its immediate
use;
- Ignoring methodological concerns of the history of thought;
- Not recoursing to philology when
necessary;
- Affirming dogmatically that a general
method to enlarge or examine our knowledge exists, elevating the model of
physico-natural sciences to the canon of science;
- Depriving human and social sciences of the
hermeneutical moment of anticipation, giving facts the ultimate criterion of truth
without realizing that, without anticipating a model, it is impossible to
escape from the repetition of the given;
- Not directing rational criticism towards an
emancipating interest
but rather remaining in the appearance of particular facts, divorcing them from
its social structure;
- Etc…
<<<<<<>>>>>>
 |
| Thomas S. Kuhn |
Even though
it is not the purpose of this writing, we shall extend into the exposure of
these criticisms in order to be able to properly support a conclusion about
popperian falsifiability.
Kuhn,
contradicting Popper, points out that science advances through paradigms in
use.
Falsifiability
turns out as a prepotent method when society is studied and considered simply
an immutable object that simply lies there and can only be captured through a
method. The pretension to subsume every
rational explanation in a nomological-deductive scheme deprives from the truth
of that same thing, which is also subjective and contradictory. On the other hand, says Quine-Duhem, an
isolated hypothesis cannot be falsed, since it always forms part of an
interdependent network of theories.
It seems to
rise from Popper’s method that that which is not effective towards reaching a
goal must be excluded from rationality and degraded to the level of
superstition. Thus remains excluded the
importance of the ends (what for which something is good for). Popperian “reason” is a “disinfected
reason”: Thought seemed to have been
reduced to the level of industrial processes and submitted to an exact plan,
this is to say that, it would be converted to a fixed part of the production. Reason interprets then every idea as a
pragmatic scheme of instrumental nature.
From there, the dictatorship of technology is just a stop away, with the
instrumentalization of the world as a result.
We believe that the ideas of thinkers such as Popper have contributed,
sadly, to the implantation of the current technological dictatorship and all
its nefarious side effects.
Society,
says Adorno, is not an object of nature;
society is contradictory, rational and irrational at the same time. Social sciences lack a system of laws as
clear and evident as the ones natural sciences have. These study a defined object that can be
boarded in an immediate fashion; the object of social sciences isn’t there, it
is neither neutral nor coherent. The
method to be applied in social sciences must take that into account or a
contradiction between its formal structure and the structure of its object will
emerge. If the basis of the scientific
method is criticism, the object of social sciences must be criticized from the
point of accepting the possibility of a society different from the one that
exists. Renouncing to a method to study society, as Popper does, is a
conservative and fatalistic attitude: one does not believe that one is able to (or
one doesn’t want to be able to?) change
that what is being studied, that is, transform society. Well, we added, Karl Popper politically supports neoliberalism (no
intervention of the state in economy matters) thus supporting his ethics in
egoism and shoving distributive justice aside.
In other words, clearly a conservative and reactionary position.
Popper is
concerned with WHAT (what is thought, believed, done) and not WHY (for example,
finding the interests generated which make a society transform in a specific
way).
There is a
palpable sense of mediocrity in the dimension of his ideas, a certain moral
pettiness evident in his conclusions.
His
philosophical attitude is all too similar to his political attitude. He shows enthusiasm in the return to a
medieval way of thought: Metaphysics, he affirms, has its place in human
knowledge; truth cannot be reached; the spine of science: determinism (and with
it the possibility of prediction –relative, but prediction nonetheless– and,
therefore, of change) does not exist; history itself (that great witness to the
iniquities to which ideas of the caste of popper’s have conducted, perched upon
what he calls “critical rationalism”) doesn’t exist either… From there to extolling the quantum gaps
through which he sees the “eternal and unattainable truths” filter through and
sentencing Psychoanalysis to death –that dangerous enemy of mystic
abnormalities–, is just a question of argumentative coherence. I am convinced that Popper constructed that
coherence being fully aware of the reactionary sense of his thought.
“The scientific conception of the world rejects
metaphysical philosophy. But how can
we explain the error of the metaphysical pathways? This question can be raised from different
standpoints: psychological, sociological and logical.
The search within the field of psychology is
still in its beginnings; the beginning of a more compelling explanation can be
found in the investigations of Freudian psychoanalysis”.
(Wiener Kreis, 1929)
Let’s
return to the problem of falsifiability even at the risk of seeming repetitive
to our patient reader.
Falsifiability
pivots on the hypothetical deductive method.
Why? Because Popper considered
scientifically incompetent the inductive method: it proved impossible, he said,
reaching general laws regarding reality from particular facts given that, once
a “law” is established, posterior observations would discredit it, and a new
law would be admitted which could, in turn, be discredited by ulterior
observations, and so forth. Induction
was insecure and inexact as a basis for science. According to Popper, scientists worked by
selecting an observation, choosing the object, conducting a defined task with a
specific interest and from a specific point of view, needing a problem. All of this indicates that, in practice,
theory precedes experiment and not vice versa.
We ignore
if the argument has been answered in the simple way in which we will answer it,
but it would exceed the intentions of this page to reproduce all the criticism
that Popper has received. In the first
place, we believe that Theory is confounded with simple Hypothesis; in the
second place, if the sought verification is reached, the manner of work can be
made flexible under the condition that the object being studied permits
it. Always, absolutely always, one must
start from science of the particular fact.
The fact of which one has preconceptions about and is obstinately trying
to prove one’s right regarding a specific idea, does not discredit the
scientific quality of the work being conducted if one arrives at the
confirmation of that idea and, from there, to the elaboration of the general
rule. The latter, in the best of cases,
will be the butterfly arisen thanks to a satisfactory metamorphosis from the chrysalis-hypothesis.
But Popper
proposes discarding the Hypothesis-led Inductive Method, and replacing it with
an imaginary or, even mythological conjecture of the world. To
Popper, that is more scientific.
By
induction, according to Popper, we will never be able to affirm, alter having
observed thousands of ravens, that “all ravens are black”. When applying falsifiability to that
conclusion we see that, to prevent the apparition of a single non-black crow,
the only scientifically valid conclusion (not a real one, since truth cannot be
reached, but, rather, approached… -?-) will be “not all crows are black”. While he accepts starting from imaginary and even mythological conjectures,
Popper rejects that there may be ultimate
scientific statements, because
they can always be presented with a
refutation based upon experience. The
observation is subtly obvious but also subtly obscurantist: on the one hand,
what he says would seem indisputably true, but, placed upon the context of his
thought, he is actually pinning on science the concepts of absolute knowledge
and eternal irremovability actually pertaining to religious dogma.
“Mediocre spirits demand of Science a sort of
certainty which it cannot give, a sort of religious satisfaction. Only the true, rare, truly scientific minds
can face doubt, into which all of our knowledge is tied.”
(Sigmund Freud)
We believe
that the Wiener Kreis, rather than getting entangled in debates with Popper’s
irrationality, should have provided him with a good net and a chair, and
entrusted upon him the task of, upon seeing a non-black crow, catching it and
bringing it in as evidence (valid, not real…) of his theory.
We, being
less prudent than the professors of the Circle, shall try to reflect upon some
critical observation of this new argument.
In the first place, given that if, as he and other metaphysics affirm,
truth is unreachable, we ignore how Popper in fact knows that we are getting
close to it… and, furthermore, how does he so absolutely know that we will
never reach it. Firstly, Popper starts
from an unproven precept, and secondly he concludes with a nihilistic assertion
which is metaphysical and obscurantist.
It is evident that this good man seems to have chosen the wrong
profession: searching absolute truths in Science when, by definition, Science
offers relative truths. He mixes these
absolute ideas (“imaginative/mythological conjectures”, “truth cannot be
known”, “experience always refutes achieved truths”) with erratic affirmations
about the scientific process (he denies that Science advances with mistakes,
and does not become paralyzed, nor does the ruin of human knowledge ensue when
a Theory succeeds another, thus refusing to realize that, if that would have
happen, we would still live in prehistoric caves) and anathematizes
inductionism for the way in which scientists work, for the “impossibility” of
reaching general laws and for appealing to the antiscientific concept of
“suspension of sufficient support” (Popper wants to say that we cannot affirm
that in the future, just as it has happened up till now, when two hydrogen and
one oxygen molecule become joined they will form water and conclude that this
result is a general law: again we believe that the solution to this false
problem that Sir Popper presents us would have been to invite him to conduct
all the necessary experiments to the end of times, in order not to have to
resort to the suspension of the sufficient support…).
 |
| Jürgen Habermas |
When
Habermas points out to him that when denying the legitimacy of the latter
substantiation –and thus considering the idea as a mere pragmatic scheme of
instrumental nature– the only thing remaining is the “principle of criticism”,
once again, in our point of view, is the true
vocation of Karl Popper put in evidence… Effectively, since the “the
principle of criticism” cannot be justified and only assumed as a decision in
favor of reason, it constitutes ultimately an act of faith; in other words, an
irrational act. The systematic
recidivism of Popper in the metaphysical cannot be attributed to anything else
but a frustrated clerical vocation. We
firmly believe that he would have been a brilliant medieval friar, after his
Christian conversion, of course.
But, since
we are talking of a highly influential, “in-fashion” thinker, his excessive
incidence in the academic world of today must be considered dangerous because
to him there would have been no difference between the following ideas (all of
which are mere pragmatic schemes of
instrumental character, according his singular conception):
“As every
development of the productive force of labor, capitalist employment of machines
only tends to lower the costs of merchandise, and thus minimizing the part of
the day in which the laborer works for himself, in order to prolong the other
part in which he works for the capitalist…”
“…a
sensible person must remember that sight may be perturbed in two ways and due
to two opposite causes: when you pass from light into darkness, or from
darkness into light.”
“Every
general theory of the world, whether it be of political or religious nature –in
occasions it is difficult to say where one ends and the other one starts–, does
not struggle as much negatively and with the purpose of destroying the world of
contrary ideas, as it does positively and with the intent of imposing its own.”
Given that
“ultimate support” does not concern him, Popper would start from the same point
of view to analyze these three ideas.
When we realize that the first one belongs to Marx, the second one to
Plato, and the third one to Hitler, we understand the dangerous aspect of such
popperian indifference a bit better.
Digression
becomes necessary here in order to revise the
Inductive Method and the positivist principles thrown to the garbage by
Karl Popper.
- Inductive Method.
To induce
is to make general affirmations from particular Facts.
All the
things and their changes, all the facts and their consequences, everything that
affects our senses are phenomena.
Example: the fall of bodies, the
influence of light upon plants. When we
confirm the reoccurrence of such observed facts, reason generalizes. It can then be affirmed that all free bodies
fall, that light influences the life of plants…
The organic and unitary whole of these generalizations (laws, rules,
propositions, concepts) which seek to explain a series of phenomena receive the
name of Theory. And then, it all
starts over again: questions arise: how do phenomena occur? Why do they occur? And to try to respond to these, new theories
are born…
- Deductive Method.
Having
certain propositions extracted from experience, reason, intuition or
imagination been accepted, other propositions are deduced.
The problem
of the deductive method is that it may lead to a Paradox: given an affirmation
(accepted propositions = postulates,
axioms, primary concepts), when all the consequences are deduced from it (deduction of properties by study, analysis,
classification) one could arrive to one that contradicts the affirmation
itself.
Therefore:
Having accepted the premises we will have to
accept the logical conclusions.
The Deductive Method could take us from an act
of faith (the
premises) to an absolute truth (the
logical conclusions).
The Inductive Method takes us from particular
facts (the
premises) to the relative truths (the
laws).
Galileo
proposed the inductive system based on the experimental method. Darwin and Freud follow it with the
necessary adaptations as determined by the object of study.
Aristotle
had proposed the deductive method.
Religious people and Popper follow it.
When, in
the explanation of certain matters, it is sustained that the inductive method
must be replaced in benefit of the deductive, errors can be made.
One must be
careful not to confuse theoretical
knowledge (reached with deductive methods), with deductive presentation of knowledge, because the theoretical knowledge
does not exclude inductive logic (for example, when choosing the object of
study through mental processes). Inductive
methods can also be employed to discover causal relations. Theoretical knowledge presupposes objects
comprehended by thought… but, differently from empirical objects, theoretical
objects are not fragments of reality but logical reconstructions of reality.
Empirical
knowledge consists of descriptions of objects, whilst theoretical knowledge
gives explanations. Those explanations can be constructive both
deductive- as well as inductively.
Methodologically, then, the union between induction and deduction is a
rule. Both are the faces of the same
process. It is not correct, therefore,
to shove aside inductive logic.
It is not
possible to reconstruct scientific history, for example, with only theoretical
analyses and the presentation of deductions; historical analysis must also be
included. This historical analysis must
begin with an inductive presentation of phenomena and laws, highlighting the
incomplete, unilateral, and contradictory empirical level reached. One may then move forth into the
theoretical level utilizing the deductive method.
The process
of theoretical knowledge must coincide with the historical process: things and
phenomena begin as forms and elemental relations which gradually develop and
deepen. From the summary of these forms
and elemental relations reached inductively, one will reach abstract
theoretical knowledge. Upon reaching
said level, can the acquired knowledge be transmitted in a more complete and
concrete form.
Deduction enables us to reconstruct
historically and logically. Induction
is previous and enables us to reach empirical abstraction. Knowledge is obtained inductively and discovered
deductively.
The
excessive devotion for deductive methods without prior serious and profound
training in inductive operations inevitably leads to the loss of the capacity
to treat fundamental data, but also, a simple truth reached inductively is always
incomplete since experience is ever unable to totally reach it.
Induction
allows for the construction of hypotheses (theoretical knowledge) that, in
turn, leads to the deductive explanations or presuppositions of new facts and
phenomena. EACH OBJECT MUST BE STUDIED WITH THE PROPER METHOD, IN THE PROPER
SITUATION AND IN THE CORRECT PROPORTION. This means that variations of the
combination of inductive and deductive methods must be accepted.
- Methods of knowledge.
a) Level 1 Empirical Induction
Based upon
empirical knowledge, the researcher investigates the object and extracts
conclusions inductively. Since pure
empirical knowledge does not exist, neither are the conclusions purely
inductive: to reach knowledge regarding
partial facts (characteristics, qualities, and concept of the object). From the situation of the problem one moves
onto the problem and from it to the hypothesis; such is the inductive path.
a1) Level
2 Empirical Induction.
There is here
already a relationship between the inductive and the deductive.
a2) Induction
and deduction in a theoretical and empirical level.
Inductively,
a hypothesis is formulated which rises from the combination of theoretical
knowledge and practical experiments, and the hypothesis is experimentally
confirmed.
a3) Deduction
and induction at the theoretical level.
The object
is explained deductively leaning upon theoretical knowledge, first as
hypothesis and then as a theory which will be proved at the empirical level (by
way of theoretical conclusions compared with the results induced from the
control tests).
a4) Deduction
at the theoretical level with inductive elements and empirical proof.
The
hypothesis rises out of prior theoretical knowledge, whether it is through the correct
application of logical principles, or logical approximations stemming from
intuitive thought.
Heuristic
thought as used to solve problems can have a deductive aspect.
a5) Deduction
at the theoretical level with inductive elements.
The
hypothesis is based upon a previous theory and elaborates upon a new theory
without proving it experimentally. This
system is employed when studying categorical-inductive systems. Notwithstanding from this method of
deductive knowledge are inductive elements included in deduction.
Conclusions
The basis
of theoretical knowledge can be found in empirical investigations and empirical
methods (observation, measurement, experimentation, comparison), which are
based upon inductive logic. The
deductive and inductive methods must be combined to achieve a correct balance
between empirical and theoretical knowledge.
Each of these methods, when combined, increase the creativity of the
investigator and develop, irrefutably, specific intellectual traits in the
researchers. Gregorio Klimovsky (an
Argentinean mathematician and philosopher) considered that there were 64
scientific methods. But the
indispensable core of scientific work is as follows:
(Not even the hypothesis would be
indispensable!)
Accepting
the hypothetic-deductive method
exclusively, as Popper would have it, would mean that no science could have
an inductive base. In other words, for
him, sciences such as Medicine,
Psychoanalysis and the so-called Life Sciences would not be considered sciences…
I do not
believe that the point of departure for Popper is the “failure” of the
inductive method to reach universal truths.
He was well aware that the progress of Science presupposed the
correction of mistakes, once such were proven to exist. He could not overlook that the merit and
highest trait of scientific knowledge was to provide humanity with the tools of
relative knowledge of reality in which its existence develops. Merit, trait, and characteristic that set
Science apart from Metaphysics and Religion.
Here is where I do believe resides Popper’s “problem”, which he tries to
solve:
The discrediting of absolute ideas and the
relegation of Metaphysics, Mysticism and Religion to the level of fantasies
linked to mental disorders. The Wiener Kreis
had already explained that “the metaphysic and theologian believe, and in this
manner become confused, that their affirmations say something or show the state
of things. Analysis, nonetheless, shows
that such affirmations say nothing but simply express a certain humor or
verve.”
Popper held
that the evolution of Physics was a process without the purpose of correction
and better approach to the truth
about the cosmos. However, in order to
know if we are indeed approaching we
need to possess a double knowledge: of the truth in and by itself, and of what
we have achieved by approaching it… How
did Popper possess such knowledge if he had indeed denied the scientific
possibility of actually know the truth?
In his
eagerness to demand that science provides absolute
truths he reveals an essentially religious mind without the use of neither
reason nor criticism, but quite the opposite.
Popper has been considered a justifier of belief; the strength of his
philosophy resides in a double destruction: that of the rationality of science,
and that of the trust in the fact that scientific knowledge is capable of
progress. Men that seek absolutes, such as Popper, interrogate
their environment in search of such absolutes.
The urgency and practice of such search cement a dominating attitude,
and even when they are able to act rationally, they will invent absolute
explanations and tend to affirm an absolute power. When searching for partialities, however,
the environment is studied without demands, cementing an attitude of
understanding by researching and deepening.
Thought will discard the existence of absolutes of any type and promote
tolerance. Affirmations will be made
within the bounds of reason and knowledge.
Nonetheless, even today, absolute ideas, brute force, and the eagerness
for power constitute a cohesive and operational structure that inform the
economic and political judeochristian-muslim world.
Popper,
according to Stove, has perpetrated a dangerous academic fraud, especially when trying to pass himself off for a
Rationalist.
Reason and
knowledge have taken refuge in Science and Culture where they have become
besieged by, with the help of Popper and others, philosophical absolutism and
pseudo-rational metaphysics.
Given that
Popper is an author who begins to write in the 1930’s, it is impossible to
avoid noticing that the divulgation and popularity of his ideas was definitively boosted
by the translations and publications of some of his basic works realized
contemporarily to the preparation and functioning of the II Vatican
Council. This establishes another point
of reference that helps us explain popperian intentionality.
(This text
is an excerpt of the essay “Elogio del Psicoanálisis” (Praise of
Psychoanalysis),
by José M.
Fernandez Santana. Total or partial
reproduction
is hereby
forbidden without written permission by the author)
